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Abstract
What factors caused the persecution of minorities in medieval and early modern Europe?
We build a model that predicts that minority communities were more likely to be
expropriated in the wake of negative income shocks. We then use panel data consisting
of 785 city-level expulsions of Jews from 933 European cities between 1100 and 1800
to test the implications of the model. We use the variation in city-level temperature to
test whether expulsions were associated with colder growing seasons. We find that a
one standard deviation decrease in average growing season temperature in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries was associated with a one to two percentage point increase in
the likelihood that a Jewish community would be expelled. Drawing on our model and
on additional historical evidence we argue that the rise of state capacity was one reason
why this relationship between negative income shocks and expulsions weakened after
1600.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, religious and ethnic minorities have been the victims of persecution. Such
persecutions were comparatively frequent in the pre-industrial world, particularly in medieval and
early modern Europe.1 In comparison, and with the important exceptions of the genocides of
the mid-twentieth century, large-scale killings, massacres, and religious persecutions are rare in
the developed world today.2 How and why did this transition from the persecuting state to the
protective state in Europe take place?
We focus on the persecution of the Jews in medieval and early modern Europe, one of the most
numerous and best documented minorities throughout European history. Violence against Jews
was caused by many factors, but we build on the common claim advanced by historians that Jews
were convenient scape-goats for social and economic ills.3 We establish the following two results.
(1) Using data on climatic variation, we identity the effect that negative economic shocks had on
minority rights in the preindustrial period. (2) We show that the relationship between climatic
shocks and the expulsion or persecution of Jewish communities was strongest in fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries and disappeared after 1600.
To clarify our empirical analysis, we develop a model that proposes two channels through which
negative economic shocks can increase the likelihood of persecution. (1) Negative economic shocks
led to popular unrest and this unrest resulted in the scapegoating of minority groups—i.e. perse-
cution from below. (2) Negative economic shocks also put greater pressure on royal finances and
led rulers to expropriate and expel the minority group—i.e. persecution from above. Both of these
channels suggest that the effect of negative weather shocks on expulsions should have been greatest
in regions with poor quality soil and, therefore, a greater underlying vulnerability to agricultural
shocks.
We construct a panel data-set comprising 785 city-level expulsions of Jews from 933 European
cities which are recorded as having Jewish populations between the years 1100 and 1800. We also
collect data on 614 incidents of violent persecution that fell short of full expulsion. These data on
Jewish populations, expulsions and other episodes of organized violence come from the 26-volume
Encyclopedia Judaica (2007). We combine this information with data on yearly growing season
1It is important to note that even in the middle ages the actual frequency of such events was low. However, it
was certainly high in comparison with everyday experience in developed countries today (see Chazen, 2010).
2This is especially true when measured on a per capita basis. For evidence and discussion of the decline of mass
killings and persecutions see Pinker (2011).
3Important historical contributions include Baron (1965a,b, 1967a,b, 1975); Chazen (2006, 2010); Israel (1985);
Jordan (1989, 1998); Mundill (1998, 2010); Poliakov (1955); Richardson (1960); Roth (1961); Stow (1981, 1992) and
many others.
1
temperature constructed by Guiot and Corona (2010) in order to identify exogenous shocks to
agricultural output. As controls, we construct measures of the suitability of a city’s surrounding
region for agriculture and its proximity to urban areas.
Our identification strategy exploits the variation in city-level temperature to test whether expulsions
were associated with colder growing seasons (April to September). Using a fixed effects specification,
we find that a one standard deviation, or about one-third of a degree, decrease in average growing
season temperature in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was associated with a one percentage
point increase in the likelihood that a Jewish community would be expelled in any given five-
year period. Under our preferred specification in which we take cities with moderate to severe
agricultural constraints as our treatment group, we find that this effect increases. As a point of
reference, the base probability of an expulsion in our sample during any given five-year period in
the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries was about 2.5%.
Our empirical analysis allows us to quantify the decline of the persecuting state and the rise of
religious tolerance in the period before democratization or the onset of modern economic growth.
We find the relationship between cold weather and Jewish expulsions to be particularly strong
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Furthermore, after 1600 there is no longer a discernible
effect of weather on expulsions. There are several possible explanations for the disappearance of
this relationship. We present evidence that indicates that the rise of more powerful states was an
important factor in explaining why weather shocks ceased to be associated with expulsions after
1600. Medieval states were weak. They were vulnerable to economic shocks and popular unrest,
and though they depended on minority groups like the Jews for financial expertise and as a source
of revenue, they were willing to sacrifice the rights of those very same minority groups in order to
sate popular anger and to meet pressing financial exigencies.4 The early modern nation states that
emerged after 1600, in contrast, succeeded in building fiscal and legal capacity; they were no longer
dependent on taxing economically prosperous minorities, and more importantly still, they enjoyed
greater political stability and ceased to be responsive to popular unrest and antisemitism.5
We follow a number of papers that use weather in order to identify the impact of economic shocks
on the political economy of preindustrial or developing economies. In particular, Miguel et al.
(2004) argued that rainfall could instrument for short-run variations in income in explaining the
causes of civil war in sub-Saharan African economies (but not in other continents).6 Bru¨ckner
4As Adam Smith noted: ‘In the disorderly state of Europe, during the prevalence of the feudal government, the
sovereign was obliged to content himself with taxing those who were too weak to refuse to pay taxes’ (Smith, 1776,
Bk V. Chap II).
5On the rise of strong fiscal states during the seventeenth century, see Tilly (1990) and Johnson and Koyama
(2012b). For the effect of this on persecution of minority groups see Johnson and Koyama (2011) and Johnson and
Koyama (2012a).
6Note that Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011) disagree about the interpretation of the results of
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and Ciccone (2011) find that lower rainfall in Africa is associated with political instability and the
timing of political transitions from autocracy to democracy and Bai and Kai-sing Kung (2011)
shows that weather shocks can generate political instability in agrarian economies. A particularly
relevant paper is Chaney (2012) who demonstrates that negative weather shocks created political
instability in pre-industrial Egypt; he finds that sharp deviations in the Nile floods strengthened
the power of religious leaders who could threaten the political authorities with revolt.7
The results we obtain are consistent with Oster (2004) who found that cold weather shocks were
associated with witchcraft trials, and Miguel (2005) who studied rainfall in contemporary Tanzania
and found that high levels of precipitation were associated with a higher number of witchcraft
deaths. They are also consistent with Anderson (2012) who finds that lower temperatures were
associated with more severe sentences being passed down by the Portuguese Inquisition.
A particularly relevant paper is Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012) who study the persistence of anti-
semitic cultural traits in Germany from the middle ages through to the twentieth century. They
show that cultural factors are an important precondition for antisemitic violence. Our findings are
complementary as we can shed light on the timing and trend of antisemitic violence.8 We find
that negative supply shocks often constituted a trigger that led to expropriations and expulsions in
societies that were permeated with antisemitism. Other related contributions include Barzel (1992)
who provides a rational choice explanation for why rulers expropriated minority Jewish lenders and
Koyama (2010b) who analyzes why the Jews were expelled from medieval England.9
Finally, our work contributes to a literature on the economic history of the Jewish people (see, for
instance, Kuznets (1960), Brenner and Kiefer (1981), and Acemoglu et al. (2011)). Our paper is
Miguel et al. (2004). Barrios et al. (2010) argue that rainfall can have a longer lasting effect, claiming that a decline
in average rainfall can account for some of the growth slowdown since the 1960s.
7Madesam et al. (2012) find that weather has an effect on the ability of political groups to organize in the modern
US. In addition there are several recent papers which investigate the effect of weather on economic outcomes. For
example, Jones and Olken (2010) look at the effect of weather on exports, Maccini and Yang (2009) investigate
the effect of weather shocks on children’s health, and Dell et al. (2011) investigate the negative effects of warm
temperatures on developing economies. Fenske and Kala (2013) show that a decrease in temperature in sub-Saharan
Africa was associated with lower morality, higher crop yields and therefore higher slave exports. Of particular
relevance for our paper, Kelly and O´ Gra´da (2010) show that cold weather shocks, as measured by tree ring data,
led to crop failures in medieval and early modern England.
8Antisemitism is a nineteenth century term. Nevertheless, following Langmuir (1990), it has also been used by
medieval historians to describe the rise of virulent anti-Jewish hatred and violence after 1100, a development which
was based upon a common set of tropes, which sought to blame Jews for personal misfortunes and tragedies (i.e. in
the case of ritual murder accusations) or for general social ills (i.e. in the charges of host desecration, well poisoning,
coin-clipping, or diabolism). See Moore (1992, 42-43) and Stacey (2000, 163-166).
9More generally, there is a growing literature on the causes of persecution. For example, Glaeser (2005) who
studies the incentive politicians have to incite hatred against particular groups; Gregory et al. (2011) who study
Stalin’s purges; Johnson and Koyama (2011) who examine the relationship between the rise of the French state and
the decline in trials for witchcraft; and Vidal-Robert (2011) who studies what factors were associated with more trials
by the Spanish Inquisition.
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particularly related to the work of Botticini and Eckstein (2012) who provide a novel explanation for
why Jews specialized as moneylenders during the middle ages. Our theoretical and empirical results
complement their account by explaining why this specialization, despite making Jews especially
valuable to medieval rulers, ultimately led to the destruction of most Jewish communities in western
Europe.
2 Jewish Expulsions and Persecution
Jews in medieval Europe comprised a ‘market dominant minority’ in the terminology of Chua
(2004), who analyzes the similar position of the Chinese in the Philippines and in the rest of South
East Asia, the Lebanese in West Africa, and the Ibo in Nigeria.10 While Jewish communities have
existed in southern Europe since Roman times, permanent Jewish communities only appeared in
northern Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries. They came for economic purposes as traders and
as merchants. Rulers encouraged Jewish settlement in order to encourage commerce, investment,
and economic development. The Bishop of Speyer in 1084 wrote: ‘When I wished to make a city
out of the village of Speyer, I Rudiger, surnamed Huozmann, bishop of Speyer, thought that the
glory of our town would be augmented a thousandfold if I were to bring Jews’ (quoted in Chazen,
2010, 101).11 By 1100 there were a large number of Jewish settlements scattered across England,
France and Germany in addition to the large Jewish population in Spain.
Botticini and Eckstein (2012) summarize a large literature that demonstrates that Jews in early
medieval Europe specialized as traders, craftsmen, doctors and merchants (Botticini and Eckstein,
2012, 153-200). Over time, however, partly as a consequence of the increasingly strict enforcement
of the canonical prohibition on usury, and partly because of comparative advantage associated
with high levels of literacy and access to a network that enabled them to share risk, Jewish traders
and merchants increasingly became specialized as moneylenders (Botticini and Eckstein, 2012, 201-
10We prefer the term ‘economically dominant minority’ to ‘market dominant minority’ since some of the reasons
why a minority group is particularly successful in commerce often has to do with regulations and other non-market
factors. The concept goes back at least as far as Max Weber (Weber, 1927). Fernand Braudel noted that ‘successful
merchants who controlled trade circuits and networks often belonged to foreign minorities, whether by nationality
(Italians in the France of Philip the Fair or Franc¸is I, and in Philip II’s Spain) or by religion - the Jews, the Armenians,
the Banyans, the Parsees, the Raskolniki in Russia or the Christian Copts in Muslim Egypt’ (Braudel, 1979, 1982,
165). This theme is also taken by Gellner (1983, 98-105). See also the essays contained in Brezis and Temin (1999)
for a survey of the literature on minorities in economic history, especially Landes (1999). In sociology the most
influential work on the role of middlemen is Bonacich (1973). Note that Jews have not always been an economically
dominant minority. By the early modern period, the vast majority of Jews in Germany and eastern Europe had lost
their former economic position.
11Chazen notes: ‘the objective was to entice new Jewish settlers . . . Early sources tell us of the invitation extended
by the Duke of Flanders to Jews to settle in his domain, of the establishment of a Jewish community in London by
William the Conqueror, newly installed as king of England’ (Chazen, 2010, 6).
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247).12
Moneylending was a lucrative industry in medieval Europe and successful Jewish moneylenders
became extremely rich.13 Thus across much of western Europe Jews had established themselves as
a prominent and successful economically dominant minority by 1150. Though Jewish usury was
frequently condemned by the Church, it was typically promoted and protected by secular rulers
both because credit was understood to be crucial to the medieval economy and because it provided
rulers with an accessible tax base. In the middle of the thirteenth century, the diet of Mainz
proclaimed that, ‘. . . as loans are necessary and Christians prohibited to lend on profit, the Jew
must be allowed to fill the gap’ (Stein, 1956, 144).14 As Baron wrote: ‘Many Jews and Christians
alike realized that, next to the religious tradition, the main reason for the former’s toleration in
western lands was the rulers’ self-interest in the revenue derived from them’ (Baron, 1967b, 198).
Kings across Europe came to see the Jews as ‘fiscal sponges’ to use a metaphor developed at the
time: ‘No sooner did they suck up the money [from the population through their usury], than
the overlords proceeded to squeeze it out of them into their own pockets’ (Baron, 1967b, 199).15
Through this process the Jews became de facto tax collectors for the king. According to the theory
employed to justify this practice, Jews were serfs of the exchequer because, in return for protection
against violence, they had submitted to the king and could therefore be taxed at his discretion
(Baron, 1967b; Chazen, 2010).16
It was in the financial interest of secular rulers to protect their Jewish communities. However,
medieval rulers struggled to make credible promises or commitments and were frequently faced
with the temptation to expropriate economically successful and wealthy Jewish communities. In
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries medieval rulers experimented with a variety of policies to
extract resources out of their Jewish subjects but by the end of the thirteenth century, it became
accepted that only by expelling the Jews could all their wealth be seized by the king in one go:
12See Baron (1967b, 135). Emery (1959); Lipman (1967); Mundill (1991) and Botticini (1997) provide excel-
lent empirical studies of how medieval Jewish moneylenders operated. For analysis of the tightening of the usury
prohibition see Chazen (1973–1974) and Koyama (2010a).
13The richest moneylender in medieval England was Aaron of Lincoln (see Jacobs, 1898); for the wealth of the
Jewish community in England see Stacey (2003, 41). It is important to note that while Jewish communities in high
medieval Europe do appear to have been relatively prosperous, this likely reflects a highly skewed distribution of
income within Jewish communities rather than the wealth or income of the median community member.
14The attitude of the Church to Jewish moneylending is detailed by Grazel (1966).
15This policy was perhaps most developed in thirteenth century England as shown by Stacey (1985, 1995) and as
analyzed by Koyama (2010b).
16In France this implicit agreement first appears to have been stated in 1198 when the Jews were readmitted into
the Royal Domain by Philip Augustus (Moore, 2008, 41). In England it followed the massacres of Jews in York and
the establishment of the Exchequer of the Jewry in 1194 (Cramer, 1940; Dobson, 2003; Brown and McCartney, 2005;
Koyama, 2010b).
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‘It would take too many administrators and petty officials to organize the arrest of
French Jews and confiscate all of their property, and most importantly, their loan
records. At any point in the process, problems could arise which would translate to
less revenue for the king. Local officials could quietly confiscate Jewish moveable prop-
erty themselves, selling it off for their own profit. Or they might agree to accept bribes
in return for allowing Jews to leave with at least some of their goods. Jews in close
relationship with nobles, and government officials, might possibly hear of the plan and
arrange to leave before it was carried out, or hide their valuables. Finally, the towns-
people could discover that the Jews were being expelled and preempt the confiscation,
taking for themselves Jewish property and the records that revealed their own indebt-
edness’ (Taitz, 1994, 220-221).
For these reasons, the French king Philip IV (1285-1314) decided on a policy of expulsion as an
expeditious way of getting his hands on as much Jewish wealth and property as possible. In so
doing he sacrificed a long-run revenue stream and therefore made the French crown permanently
poorer (Jordan, 1989).17
It is important not to overstate the frequency with which Jewish communities were threatened with
violence and pogroms—many Jewish communities lived in peace with their Christian neighbors for
long periods of time.18 But as an economically dominant minority in poor and largely agrarian
economies, and as outsiders in a society that increasingly aggressively defined itself in opposition
to infidels and unbelievers, Jews often aroused jealousy and suspicion from others.19
The persecution and eventually expulsions of the Jews paved the way for what R.I. Moore has
termed the rise of ‘a persecuting society’ in medieval Europe (Moore, 1987).20 The persecution
17Mechoulann (2004) demonstrates that at a discount factor equal to the prevailing 12 percent interest rate this
decision may well have been the correct one for Philip IV given the political and fiscal situation he faced. Subsequent
expulsions followed this pattern and involved some form of expropriation with minor variations. In 1492 the Jews
of Spain were allowed to take their private possessions with them but forbidden from taking gold, silver, or minted
coins while their communal property was distributed to local town councils (Beinart, 2002, 55-56).
18See Shatzmiller (1990) for evidence of distinctly philo-semitic attitudes among at least some of the citizens of
Marseilles.
19See Moore (2008, 26-42). This hostility could manifest itself among elite groups as well as among peasants. In
Renaissance Italy, Jewish moneylenders lent to the poor and were often championed by them, and were typically,
instead, opposed by city elites (Botticini, 2000). It is important to stress that we do not attempt to provide an
economic or rational choice explanation for the virulent anti-semitism that emerged in medieval Europe and which
had a variety of sources (see Trachtenberg, 1943; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012). Menache (1985, 1997) analyzes the
importance of the blood libel myth in generating an atmosphere conducive to expulsion. What we do attempt to
explain is why negative economic shocks led to the expulsion and expropriation of Jewish communities in some polities
but not in others.
20Jews were an important minority through the Islamic Middle East throughout this period where they also
performed an important economic function as middlemen and merchants (Gerber, 1981; Bruade and Lewis, 1982;
Kuran, 2004). Jews were subject to occupational restrictions and additional taxes but though they were sometimes
subject to persecution in the Middle East (for example, in Fez in 1465), this was much less frequent than in Europe
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and expulsion of Jews in the medieval period set a powerful precedent for the persecution of other
minority groups (lepers, heretics, homosexuals, and witches) that continued into the modern period.
However, during the seventeenth century, although antisemitic massacres and expulsions continued
to take place, particularly in central and eastern Europe, some western European states began to
readmit Jewish migrants and offer them some measure of toleration and protection. Jews began
to migrate to the Dutch Republic after its declaration of independence from Spain, with large
numbers of so-called crypto-Jews arriving in 1593. The rights of Jews to practice their religion
in the Netherlands was codified in 1619. Oliver Cromwell invited Jews to return to England in
1655 (Kaplan, 2007, 326). Jews began to resettle in France from 1600 onwards. The first Jewish
community to receive recognition was that of Metz in 1595, but in general the legal status of
Ashkenazi Jews in France was unclear until 1675 when Louis XIV granted the Jews of Alsace
and Lorraine the right of permanent residency. It wasn’t until 1723 that the Sephardic Jews in the
southwest of France were officially recognized (see Israel (1985, 42) and Kaplan (2007, 321)). Having
suffered expulsion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Jews were gradually admitted back into
Prussia by Fredrick William, the Great Elector in the 1660s as part of his project of centralizing and
rebuilding the Prussian state and economy (Israel, 1985, 121-122). In the eighteenth century these
policies were imitated by other German rulers. These dates mark the beginnings of a broader,
extremely gradual but fundamentally important, move from a persecuting to a protective state
which began in the period after the Reformation and is still continuing today.
The historical record suggests that the persecution of European Jewish communities in the medieval
and early modern period followed an inverted U-shaped pattern, peaking during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries before decreasing in intensity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One
explanation for this pattern is that fiscally weak cities and states expelled Jews in order to satisfy
revenue needs (Elman, 1937; Schwarzfuchs, 1967; Veitch, 1986; Barzel, 1992). Others argue that
Jews were expelled in response to heightened religious fervor in the late medieval period (Grazel,
1966; Langmuir, 1990; Stow, 1992; Menache, 1997; Bell, 2001) or as part of a project of construct-
ing a religiously or ethnically homogeneous state (Baron, 1967a; Katznelson, 2005; Barkey and
Katznelson, 2011); or to a confluence of these factors as Moore (1987) argued in his Formation
of a Persecuting Society. Alternatively, Poliakov (1955) attributed the decline in the fortunes of
European Jewry in the fourteenth century to the series of calamities that befell Europe from the
Great Famine of 1315–1322 to the Black Death and numerous individual accounts of specific per-
secutions or pogroms cite that the role played by economic hardship, natural disasters and bad
weather in triggering particular persecutions or expulsions (Barber, 1981a; Cohn, 2007; Slavin,
2010; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012).
(Cohen, 1994).
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In the next section we develop a model to help guide us in choosing variables to distinguish between
these alternative explanations. In particular, the model will suggest that economic shocks will lead
to persecutions, and that this relationship is particularly likely to strong in states that are weak
and lack developed tax systems. We will then test the first hypothesis using weather data as an
exogenous source of revenue shocks. If our hypothesis, and the historical narrative outlined above,
are correct, we would expect weather shocks to increase the likelihood of expulsions during the
period in which medieval states were establishing and consolidating themselves but during which
they remained fiscally undeveloped and vulnerable to revolt and civil war during the fourteenth
through the sixteenth centuries. However, there should be little correlation between persecution of
Jewish communities and income shocks as states grew fiscally stronger during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
3 A Model of Protection and Persecution
To explore the relationship between political stability, income shocks, and expulsions, we construct
a simple model of the medieval economy. There are two sectors: an agrarian peasant sector and a
commercial sector. We assume that the mercantile sector is dominated by the minority (Jewish)
community. This assumption is roughly appropriate for much of medieval Europe, particularly if
the commercial sector of the economy is identified with moneylending (see Botticini and Eckstein,
2012). Standard models of an autocratic state (e.g., McGuire and Olson (1996)) cannot explain
why the King would ever expel a valuable fiscal resource like the Jews. Thus, to understand why
expulsions did take place we need a model in which the King cannot credibly commit to protecting
the Jews. Our reasoning in what follows below is related to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) in that
there is revolution or revolt constraint that can force the autocrat into undertaking expropriations
or expulsions. It is also related to the reasoning developed by Acemoglu (2003) in that Jews cannot
make a Coasian bargain with the King in order to avoid expulsion.
There are two mechanisms through which negative weather shocks might lead to antisemitic violence
and expulsions. Both are affected by the ability of the state to either protect the revenues it
collects from the Jewish community, or, find alternative sources of revenue during difficult economic
conditions. The first mechanism operates through popular anger and rebellion. Jews were often
scapegoats for economic and social ills and, as economic conditions worsened, it became more
likely that existing antisemitic attitudes would be channelled into violence and demands to expel
the Jewish community. In this case, expulsions occur because the King is too weak to protect
the minority community. The second mechanism involves a ‘top-down’ expulsion by the King as a
means to seize the assets of the Jewish community. The value of the model is that it emphasizes
that the strength of both channels depend on the capacities of the state.
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We suppose that income in the agrarian sector is determined by inelastically supplied labor inputs l
which we normalize to 1, the level of agricultural productivity A, and an exogenous weather shock ω
such that Y A = A−ω where ω > 0. The King imposes a lump-sum tax τA ∈ R on the agricultural
sector. There is no storage technology.21
Production in the commercial sector takes place over two periods: 1 and 2. Output is determined
by investment in capital, k, made in period 1 so that YM1 = f(k1)− c(k1) where c(k) is the cost of
investment, f ′(k) > 0, and f ′′(k) < 0. Commercial income in period 2 is YM2 = f(k1). Thus, while
commercial output is unaffected by agrarian shocks, period 2 output is affected by investments
made in period 1. The King imposes a tax on the commercial sector at the end of both periods:
τMt where t = (1, 2).
A large realization of ω will in our empirical framework correspond to colder weather during the
growing season. Colder weather leads to reduced grain yields and lower peasant incomes. Faced
with penury, the peasants have the option of rebelling. If they rebel, the minority community is
expropriated, which historically was often synonymous to an expulsion occurring. The peasants
are successful with probability γ and if they are successful they obtain ∆. The peasants rebel if
and only if the no-rebellion constraint is violated:
A− ω − τA ≥ γ∆ . (1)
Large negative weather shocks (ω) also put pressure on state finances and hence make Royal
expulsions more likely, but the mechanism is less direct than that flowing through the peasantry.
The King has an incentive to protect the minority community, as they are an important source
of revenue. As we shall show, however, he does have an incentive to expel if he faces a need for
immediate revenue or a rebellion. In order to capture the inter-temporal nature of this decision,
we suppose, for analytical convenience, that the minority community are not modeled as strategic
actors. We simply assume that they invest the optimal level of capital, k, in order to maximize
profit, pi, regardless of the King’s policy. Thus, we write pi1 = f(k1) − c(k1) in period 1 and
piM2 = f(k2) in period 2.
22 The minority community, therefore, invests k = k∗ where k∗ is the
profit-maximizing level of investment and is given by f ′(k∗) = c′(k∗)/2.
The King decides what tax rate to impose in each period.23 His optimal second period tax always
21McCloskey and Nash (1984) demonstrated that medieval interest rates and the costs of grain storage meant that
medieval peasants did not store grain.
22It is straightforward to augment our model by allowing the minority community to rationally decide how much
to invest or whether or not to migrate based upon their expectations of the King’s future tax policy, but it does not
change our predictions.
23The King discounts second period tax revenues but the minority community do not discount future income.
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expropriates the minority community: τ¯M2 = f(k1). This is by construction. A more general model
would involve more periods, however, what we are interested in is the King’s choice of tax rate
in the first period. The optimal unconstrained first period tax is equal to: τ¯M1 = f(k1) − δc(k1).
A King who does not value the future (δ = 0) would set τM1 equal to f(k1) and expropriate the
entirety of M ’s capital while a King who discounts the future at the same rate as the mercantile
community (δ = 1) would set a tax that equates marginal revenues in both periods.
The King maximizes total revenue subject to the no-rebellion constraint being satisfied:
max
τA,τM
τA + τM1 + δτ
M
2 (2)
subject to (A− ω − τA) ≥ γ∆ (no rebellion)
There are three cases to consider. First, when ω is small, the peasants do not rebel, the King sets
τA, τM1 , τ
M
2 so as to maximize total revenue: τ
A = A − ω, τM1 = f(k1) − δc(k1) and τM2 = f(k1).
When shocks are small or negative (which in this case means ω is negative), the King only expels the
minority community M when he has dire need of immediate revenue: i.e. δ = 0 or for non-economic
reasons.
Alternatively, when ω is large relative to γ, the no-rebellion constraint cannot be satisfied. The
minority group is expropriated by the peasants or by local elites acting in response to the demands
for the peasantry. This corresponds to cases like the massacres of Jews that occurred during the
Pastoureaux in France in 1320, or the Armleder pogroms in Alsace in 1338-1339.
Note that although we couch our argument in terms of peasant uprisings, our model is also consistent
with the fact that anti-Jewish violence was often organized by local elites. This was the case in
York in 1190 and in Germany and Italy in the fifteenth centuries as it was often local notables
rather than peasants who were in debt to Jewish moneylenders (Cohn, 2007, 23-24). In these cases,
it was local elites rather than peasants who demanded the expulsion of the Jews.24
Finally, intermediate values of ω can put pressure on royal finances and this can induce the King
to expropriate the minority community even though it is in his long-term interest not to do so.
This captures the fact that medieval rulers typically discounted the future more rapidly than did the merchant class.
24Also note that the anger that was directed against the Jews could also be directed against other groups who
were singled either for having tax privileges like the clergy or because they occupied a distinctive economic niche.
Lombards were first expelled from France in 1268 (Kedar, 1996, 179). During the Black Death in Narbonne it was
the English who were blamed for the disease (Breuer, 1988, 142). In the 1391 massacres in Spain ‘the targets were
not just Jews . . . the insurgents ‘threatened to kill all clerics and forced them to pay taxes and other contributions
as if they were laymen. Silversmiths, merchants and other rich people were threatened with death’ (Cohn, 2007, 33).
Cohn further notes ‘despite some executions, Barcelona’s revolt largely succeeded: taxes were lowered’ (Cohn, 2007,
33).
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This occurs when only negative values of τA satisfy the no-rebellion constraint, forcing the King
to set τM1 > τ¯
M
1 , with τ
M
2 = f(k1) as before. In the limit, as ω approaches (A - γ∆− τA) then τM1
equals f(k1), which is equivalent to expropriating the minority group. This mechanism explains
the actions of Henry III of England in the 1240s and 1250s who extracted tremendous amounts of
revenues from the Jewish community in order to avoid calling Parliament and thus compromising
with his political opponents (Stacey, 1985, 1987; Koyama, 2010b).
This framework predicts that the probability of expulsion is increasing in the size of the negative
weather shock (ω) (Prediction 1). Bad weather should also be more likely to lead to expulsions
in areas which are less fertile or have lower quality soil (lower A) (Prediction 2). Finally, negative
shocks are more likely to result in expulsions when the ruler is weak (γ is high) (Prediction 3).25
Lastly, the model distinguishes between two different mechanisms through which bad weather might
cause expulsions. The first mechanism is the most straightforward: negative weather shocks lead
to popular violence against Jews. This is the scapegoating mechanism. The second mechanism is
indirect. Medieval states were weak and as a result, negative income shocks put pressure on the
revenue streams of medieval rulers; pressure that made them more likely to seek alternative sources
of revenue and thus to expel or expropriate Jewish communities.
4 Historical Evidence
4.1 Bad Weather, Popular Uprisings, and Antisemitic Violence
Prediction 1, that periods of economic crisis increased the likelihood of Jews being persecuted, is
not original to us nor should it be surprising.26 A number of the most famous instances of violence
against Jews were linked to negative economic shocks, particularly to bad weather and harvest
failure. Norman Cohen argued that the locations in which Jews were targeted during the First
Crusade in 1095, northeastern France and western Germany, were precisely those where there had
been flooding, droughts, and famines (Cohen, 1957, 63). More recent research substantiates this
view:
‘there were disastrously dry summers in 1090 in Flanders, Western Germany and East-
ern France. In Normandy, the following year was characterized by a dry summer and
exceedingly wet winter. In Eastern Germany and Bohemia, the winter of 1091-2 lasted
25Additionally, expulsions are more likely to occur when the ruler discounts the future heavily (δ = 0). We do not
explore this prediction empirically in this paper but, as De Long and Shleifer (1993) discuss, short princely horizons
were common: 18 of 31 English monarchs had succession problems.
26There is an entire volume entitled Anti-Semitism in Times of Crisis (Gilman and Katz, 1991).
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well into April. The fall of 1093 saw abundant downpour in various parts of Germany
and Flanders, which extended until April of the following year. In 1095, there was a
prolonged drought in Flanders and France. An earthquake is reported in Flanders on
10 September 1095, while one nearly contemporary author states that it was felt all
over Northern Europe, from France to Denmark . . . The year of 1090 saw a widespread
outbreak of ergotism, or St. Anthonys Fire, in Germany, France and Flanders. But
the crisis became especially acute in September 1093, when an unknown disease of
disastrous proportions broke out in Germany and the Low Countries, lasting into the
following year. Several chronicles also report an outbreak of cattle pestilence around
the same time. In France, a harsh drought of spring and summer 1095 brought about
a widespread famine, which, in turn, caused starvation and mortality. (Slavin, 2010,
177-178).27
Agricultural productivity was low in medieval Europe and successive years of bad weather could
easily push large numbers of peasants living on the margins of subsistence into starvation. The
economic crisis of the early 1090s manifested itself through soaring grain prices and famine and it
generated social unrest as peasants in Flanders and parts of France rose up against landlords and
destroyed property (Slavin, 2010, 193). The violence against Jews was one aspect of this general
social reaction:
The widespread starvation and mortality increased not only the religious zeal of the
distressed masses, but also their animosity, intolerance and violence towards the ‘other’.
The most immediate and visible ‘other’ was the local Jewish communities, which were
the first ones to fall victims to this popular violence (Slavin, 2010, 198).
A succession of even more disastrous harvests occurred across northern Europe between 1315 and
1321. Campbell describes it as possibly ‘the single worst subsistence crisis, in terms of relative
mortality, in recorded European history’ (Campbell, 2010, 7). That series of failed harvests were
followed by the so-called Great Bovine Pestilence which wiped out sixty percent of livestock on the
continent (Slavin, Forthcoming). These shocks not only generated economic hardship, they also
produced civil unrest across swathes of northern Europe. France was shaken by an uprising known
as the Shepherds’ Crusade, or the Pastoureaux, that challenged royal authority and specifically
targeted the Jews who had been readmitted into the kingdom in 1315. First in Normandy and
the Paris region, they attacked royal castles, then they moved south where they persecuted Jews
27The massacres of 1096 are the subject of considerable scholarly debate (see Kedar, 1998). A range of other
factors were also at work, including a desire of vengeance against all enemies of Christianity and a messianic attempt
to convert the Jews by force and thereby bring about the end of days, but most accounts also emphasize that cash
and the desire to loot was also a major motivation in the persecutions (see, for example Riley-Smith, 1986, 52). As
Cohen notes: ‘[d]ifferent explanations for the massacres of 1096 are hardly mutually exclusive’ (Cohen, 2004, 2).
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throughout Languedoc in cities like Saintes, Verdun, Grenade, Castelsarrasin, Toulouse, Cahors,
Le´zat, Albi, Auch, Rabastens and Gaillac (Barber, 1981a, 12).
Several historians have argued that the Pastoureaux targeted Jews because of millennial fantasies
about the End of Days or because they displaced their anger at the Muslim reconquest of the
Holy Land onto the nearer infidel (see Cohen, 1957) and Shepkaru (2012). However, it was also
the case that the Pastoureaux were supported in their attacks on the Jews by townspeople and
others because of widespread resentment against royal policy and royal taxation. In 1320 ‘[t]he
brunt of peasant violence fell upon the Jews, for they were the only non-Christians within reach
of the Pastoureaux and they could be blamed for the economic hardships which the lower classes
had recently been suffering’ (Barber, 1981b, 163).28 The conditions under which the Jews had been
allowed to return to France in 1315 required them to act as fiscal agents for the crown. Nirenberg
argues that ‘the shepherds and the townspeople who supported them’ understood this relationship,
and ‘recognized that the heavy taxes placed on Jews were a form of indirect taxation on Christians’
(Nirenberg, 1996, 48). When the Pastoureaux attacked Jews and looted their possessions in face of
royal attempts to protect them ‘they were both attacking a much-resented aspect of administrative
kingship and dramatizing the state’s inability to protect its agents, the Jews’ (Nirenberg, 1996, 50).
In terms of the model, both the Peasants’ Crusade of 1096 and the rebellion of the Pastoureaux
correspond to the case where ω is large relative to γ: the King was unable to keep order and as a
result the minority group where expropriated by the rebelling peasantry.29
4.2 Royal Weakness and Expulsions
Our model suggests that external shocks in conjunction with internal political weakness was re-
sponsible for the failure of medieval and early modern European states to protect minority groups
such as the Jews (the size of ω relative to γ).30 As Chazen writes: ‘governmental weakness or
breakdown posed significant danger to the Jews of medieval western Christendom’ because:
‘[a]t points of governmental breakdown, the power to intercede effectively against pop-
ular passions was much reduced, and Jews thus lay exposed to outbreaks of popular
violence’ (Chazen, 2010, 179).
28Tension had been building for some time as a result of the poor harvests and the peasants undertook religious
demonstrations and parades aimed at ending the famine (Barber, 1981b, 162-163). Contemporaries also mention that
they were incited by debtors of the Jews (Barber, 1981b, 146).
29The Pastoureaux were repressed wherever possible: the official documents that have survived ‘reflect the concern
of the authorities for public order and tell a story of punitive military action, fines and confiscations, stressing that
the Pastoureaux were mortal enemies of both the king and the public weal’ (Barber, 1981b, 157).
30Strong rulers like Edward I and Philip IV also expelled Jews. But we expect the relationship between negative
economic shocks and expropriations to be particularly strong in weakly governed states.
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This statement is borne out by a discussion of the fate of Jewish communities in fourteenth century
Germany.31 Where the Holy Roman Emperor had authority and power, he typically used it to
protect Jews—less out of sentiment, but because he viewed them as an economic asset. This is
evident in the response of Charles IV to the massacres that followed the Black Death in 1349.
Charles protected Jews in Prague and in other areas where his authority was strong, but elsewhere
he was prepared to let his subjects burn Jews.
‘When the plague was at its height and the bands of flagellants were sweeping across
the country, he sold or transferred the holdings of the Jews, if and when they should
be killed, to the cities and nobles who saw fit to support him. In exchange for all of
these payments, the Jews could expect one thing: that the king, the nobles, and the
city councils who had benefited from their monies would protect them. Undoubtedly,
they were legally and morally obligated to do so and there is no reason to doubt that
they would indeed have preferred to protect the lives of their Jews in order to continue
to benefit from their money. However, under the circumstances we have described it
appeared that they would not be successful, they decided to turn the destruction of the
Jews to their best advantage’ (Breuer, 1988, 146-147).32
In Brandenburg, where Louis I was faced with a rebellion, initial attempts to protect Jews from
accusations of well-poisoning ‘broke down under the frenzy of the populace, whose good will the em-
battled margrave could not afford to lose’ and in 1351 Louis allowed Jews to be burnt in Ko¨nigsberg
(Baron, 1965a, 211). The massacres and expropriations more or less wiped out the Jewish commu-
nities in the Electorate.
Similarly, in Bavaria, the Dukes of Wittelsbach were unable to prevent Jews being massacred by
peasant and noble uprisings in 1298, in 1338 and in 1349. As the power of the Holy Roman Em-
peror waned in the fifteenth century, Jews all across Germany suffered persecution and expulsion.
In 1420-21, 400 Jews in Styria and Carinthia were executed and the rest of the population expelled.
Jews were expelled from other territories in Austria in 1453 and 1455, although they continued to
reside in Lower Austria (Baron, 1965a, 198-199). The Jews of Augsburg were expelled in 1440 as
were those in Saxony in 1498. And over the course of the fifteenth century, Jews were progressively
banished from the cities of Bavaria.33 The long-standing Jewish community of Ratisbon (Regens-
burg) was expelled in 1519, an event that had been preceded by a series of expropriations and fiscal
31Baron (1965a) titles a chapter ‘victim of feudal anarchy’ to describe the fate of Jews in Germany.
32Charles IV subsequently forgave the perpetrators of the massacres, noting ‘that the populace had been “animated
by vulgar prejudice, bad advice, and reprobate feelings” when it attacked Jews and thus caused much damage to the
royal Treasury, he nevertheless accepted the regrets and satisfaction offered him by the city elders’ (Baron, 1965a,
158-159).
33Upper Bavaria 1442, Lower Bavaria in 1450, Eichsta¨dt and Passua in 1477-78, Nuremberg in 1498, and finally
from all Bavaria in 1551 (see Baron, 1965a, 209).
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exactions (Baron, 1965a, 233-234).34 Together the historical accounts of individual persecutions
and expulsions support the prediction that negative economic shocks were associated with persecu-
tions and expulsions (Prediction 1); they do not directly speak to the prediction that the effect of
bad weather should be highest in lands with poor soil quality, but they are broadly consistent with
it (Prediction 2); and they support the hypothesis that this relationship was likely to be stronger
in weakly governed states (Prediction 3).
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present data and an empirical strategy which allow us to directly test Predictions
1 and 2. Prediction 1 states that negative weather shocks and persecution of Jews should be
positively correlated while according to Prediction 2, this correlation will be stronger in areas with
geography less suitable for wheat cultivation since they will be more vulnerable to shocks. To test
these, we combine city-level data on the timing of Jewish expulsions and persecutions with data
on growing season temperature variation. Since yearly fluctuations in temperature are unrelated
to other factors which might trigger an expulsion (such as changing ideology or exogenous political
shocks), this provides an ideal test of Prediction 1. In order to test Prediction 2, we combine
our data with information on wheat cultivation suitability and investigate if the effect of negative
temperature shock on expulsions increases. Since soil quality, elevation, and the other components
that go into the calculation of wheat suitability are all exogenous, this provides a clean test of our
model.
Our empirical strategy will also allow us to provide indirect evidence for Prediction 3 from the
model, which states that weather shocks should be more likely to cause an expulsion when the
ruler is weak. We do not have a direct measure of ‘weakness’, by which we mean both fiscal
capacity (the ability to raise revenues) and legal capacity (the ability to enforce rule of law), at the
city level. Thus, we cannot test our prediction directly. Instead, our empirical strategy will allow
us to describe how the relationship between weather shocks and expulsions varied over time. We
will then compare this temporal relationship to what we know about European state capacity over
time to see if it supports Prediction 3.
34Baron notes that, ’. . . [r]oyal weakness came clearly to the fore in such incidents as when George Podeˇbrad
admitted several Jewish individuals to settlement in Eger in 1462, promising them, in return for annual payment of
150 Rhenish florins, the enjoyment of all rights of the other Jewish serfs of his Chamber. Yet seven years later a
local lord, Henry von Gera, had to appeal to the Eger city council not to confiscate the Jewish communal property
in which his subjects had a share. In 1480 the elders of Eger unabashedly rejected King Vladislav’s request that they
continue to tolerate Jews’ (Baron, 1965a, 204).
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5.1 Data
We collect city–level data on the presence of a Jewish community in Europe between 1100 to 1800
from the twenty-six volume Encyclopedia Judaica (2007). The Encyclopedia typically mentions
when Jews entered a city, when they were persecuted, when they were expelled, and when they
were allowed re-entry. We are interested in all of these pieces of information since in order to model
the probability of an expulsion from a city, we need to know when that city had a Jewish population
to expel.
The Encyclopedia provides a comprehensive measure of Jewish presence, persecution and expulsion
for the whole of Europe. It does not contain information on all of the smaller Jewish communities
that may have existed and it likely does not contain information on minor persecutions. Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2012) uses more detailed data for Jewish persecutions in medieval Germany. But the
two sources they employ only provide data for Germany. The Encyclopedia Judaica provides less
detail but compensates for this with wider geographic and temporal coverage.
Figure 1 gives a sense for both the geographic coverage of our Jewish city data as well as the
distribution of expulsions for the entire period. There are 1,069 cities in our complete data set. We
construct three variables based on these data. A dummy variable called ‘Expulsion’ which is equal
to one if there is an expulsion in a city in a given year and zero otherwise. There are 810 expulsions
in the complete data set. We also construct a variable ‘Expulsion or Persecution’ which is equal
to one if there is either an expulsion or some lesser form of persecution in a given year. There are
1,471 of these events. Finally, we construct a variable called ‘Jewish Presence’ which is equal to
one during all the years there is a known Jewish community in the city and zero otherwise. There
is a Jewish community present in the average city about 40% of the time. The Data Appendix
gives more detail on the construction of these variables.
Our identification strategy relies on exogenous variation in weather. These data are taken from
Guiot and Corona (2010) who assemble information from proxy sources including ninety-five tree
ring series, sixteen indexed climatic series based on historical documents, ice-core isotopic series,
and pollen-based series to construct a thirty-two point grid of reconstructed temperature during
the growing season (April to September) for all of Europe between 900 and the present-day. Their
historical temperature reconstructions are based on a model mapping proxies into growing season
temperatures. This model is calibrated using actual temperature data from 1850–2007. We use
geospatial software to interpolate the temperature for the area between the grid points so that
we have a smooth map for each year. Finally, we extract the yearly temperatures for each of our
cities. We follow Guiot and Corona (2010) in expressing the temperature data in terms of anomalies
relative to the 1961–1990 average.
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Figure 1: Jewish Cities and Expulsions, 1100-1800. Symbols represent a city that had a Jewish
population at some time between 1100 and 1800. Circles represent a Jewish city that has at least one
expulsion. Larger circles represent more expulsions. Triangles are Jewish cities in our data that never
expel. Source: Encyclopedia Judaica (2007).
The Guiot and Corona (2010) data match well with known historical ‘forcing’ events, such as vol-
canic eruptions, which have been shown to cause colder temperatures. They are also consistent with
glacial records. When compared to specific ‘known’ cold and warm years from the historical record
the temperatures are consistent approximately 75% and 65% of the time respectively (Guiot and
Corona, 2010, Table 2). We will run some of our regressions using yearly data, but in order to take
into account both potential lagged effects and the inherent noisiness of yearly data reconstructed
from hundreds of years in the past, our preferred specifications will be based on five-year averaged
temperature deviation data. Thus, our primary variable of interest will be the five-year averaged
temperature deviation which we will call ‘Temp Deviation’ in our analysis below. Further details
on the construction of the temperature data are contained in the Appendix.
Another important variable in our analysis is the suitability of the area around each city for wheat
cultivation. Having these data will allow us to perform a more refined test of our model, since cities
with more constrained agriculture are expected to suffer more from negative temperature shocks.
We focus on wheat since it was a relatively homogenous staple crop across Europe during this
period. Kelly and O´ Gra´da (2010) also provide direct evidence that reconstructed growing season
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temperatures affected wheat yields in late medieval and early-modern England. Our suitability data
come from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO’s) Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
2002 database (Fischer et al., 2002).35 This provides us with estimates of a region’s suitability for
wheat cultivation at a resolution of 0.5 degrees by 0.5 degrees, which is a little over fifty by fifty
kilometers at the latitude of central France. This seems an appropriate level of resolution for use
with our data since most cities would rely on an agricultural sector within roughly fifty kilometers
from the city walls.
The FAO database is constructed using two types of information. Detailed information on the char-
acteristics of 154 crops is compiled to determine what sorts of geographic and climatic conditions
are optimal for growing each plant. This information is combined with climatic and geographic
data collected on a very disaggregated level. The climate data include measures of precipitation,
frequency of wet days, mean temperature, daily temperature range, vapor pressure, cloud cover,
sunshine, ground-frost frequency, and wind speed. The geographic data include information on soil
types and slope characteristics. The FAO combines these data to construct potential yields for each
crop in each grid cell under different levels of inputs and management. We assume a ‘moderate’
level of inputs to wheat cultivation. This is consistent with farmers who produce primarily for home
consumption, but with some market orientation. Figure 2 shows the resulting suitability of wheat
cultivation across Europe. We extract the wheat suitability for each of our cities using geospatial
software and then follow a similar strategy as Nunn and Qian (2011) in creating a dummy variable
equal to one if a city has an agricultural sector which is either moderately or significantly con-
strained in its wheat cultivation. This is the main variable ‘Poor Wheat Suitability’ that we use in
our regressions.
One potential concern with our estimates is that the effect of weather shocks on expulsions will
interact with either the economic development of a city or the city’s access to markets. In order to
control for this possibility, and better isolate the effect of state capacity on expulsions, we include
a proxy for these factors in our regressions. Estimates of per capita GDP do not exist for the
medieval period. Studies of preindustrial Europe, therefore, rely on urbanization data as a proxy
for commercial and market development (see De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2005;
Nunn and Qian, 2011, amongst many others). We use data on urban population from Bosker et al.
(Forthcoming) as this supersedes previous datasets (e.g. Bairoch (1988)). Bosker et al. provides
estimates of urban population for cities with populations greater than 5,000. There are about eight
hundred cities included in the Bosker et al. database with population estimates for each century
from 1100 to 1800 (see Data Appendix for maps and more detail). Since the Bosker et al. cities
do not perfectly correspond to our 1,050 Jewish cities, we use geospatial software to create a map
of ‘average urbanization’ for all Jewish cities lying within at least one hundred kilometers of a
35This is the same data source as is used by Nunn and Qian (2011) and Nunn and Puga (2012).
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Figure 2: Wheat suitability. A lighter shade indicates that the soil is more suitable for wheat
cultivation. Source: Fischer et al. (2002).
Bosker et. al. city. Average urbanization is created for each point on the map using the inverse
distance-weighted populations of the surrounding Bosker et al. cities that are within at least one
hundred kilometers of the point. This results in eight estimates for urban population for 933 or our
Jewish cities between 1100 and 1800.36 We then do a linear imputation between each data point
for each city in order to arrive at a time varying measure of urban density. We call the resulting
variable ‘Urban Density’ in our analysis.
We will restrict our analysis to use only the sample of cities that currently have a Jewish population.
Thus, in our regressions, cities without a Jewish population will be treated as missing variables.
This approach is consistent with a conventional strategy used in discrete-time survival analysis as
discussed by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and Yamaguchi (1991). It also allows us greater
flexibility in our estimation of regression models suited for our time varying data, such as our
preferred fixed effects specification. Furthermore, our results will also be easier to interpret than
with the alternative Cox hazard models. See the Data Appendix for further discussion.
In Figure 3 we show the time series behavior of average temperature deviation across all cities and
36The heat maps for each century are reproduced in the Data Appendix. The 133 cities we lose are all in the far
east (mostly present–day Ukraine, Lithuania, and Serbia) and when we re-run the regressions without urban density,
but including these cities our regression results are unaffected.
19
Figure 3: Average Five-Year Temperature Deviation and Expulsions from 1100 to 1800. The temper-
ature deviations are relative to the 1961-1990 average in degrees celsius. The total expulsions variable
is the sum of expulsions in every five-year period. Source: See Text.
total expulsions between 1100 and 1800. There are two prominent outliers in the expulsions data,
the period around the Black Death (1346-1355) and the expulsion of Jews from all of Spain in
1492. We discuss national expulsions in more detail in the Data Appendix. But there is no a priori
reason to exclude national-level expulsions from our analysis, since the mechanism outlined in the
model section relating weather shocks to expulsions should apply in these cases. Nonetheless, we
will present results with 1492 excluded from our sample to demonstrate that our results are robust
to omitting this data point.
The Black Death is another outlier in terms of expulsions. A large number of expulsions and
persecutions in the fourteenth century arose as a result of the social upheavals which attended
the Plague (Cohn, 2007; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012). The fact that the Black Death triggered
antisemitic violence is entirely consistent with our hypothesis and theoretical model. However, given
the severity of the plague in Europe and since there is no reason to think there is a relationship
between the presence of the plague and the temperature, we will report results below in which we
both do and do not control for the years of the Black Death.
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our final baseline five-year data set contains 933 Jewish cities that are each in the sample an average
of about sixty of the five-year periods (i.e. those cities have a Jewish presence, on average, for three
hundred of the years between 1100 and 1800). Table 4 in the Data Appendix provides descriptive
statistics for the five-year data set. The average temperature deviation across all years in our
regression sample is about -0.057 degrees celsius with a standard deviation of 0.339. Significantly
for our analysis, the within standard deviation of temperature is more than three times larger than
the between standard deviation. This implies a large amount of correlation in temperature across
cities relative to the year-on-year variation.
Across the entire sample, the baseline probability of an expulsion is about 1.4% every five years.
The baseline probability of either an expulsion or persecution every five years is about 2.5%. To
place this last number in perspective, it implies over a 20% chance of either a persecution or
expulsion of a Jewish community over fifty years. Similar to the Temp Deviation variable, the
within variation in Expulsions is higher than the between variation by about a factor of four. One
plausible explanation for this is the high amount of correlation in temperature shocks across cities.
Because of this, we will run our regressions using both a city fixed effects specification as well as
some difference-in-differences specifications. We will actually prefer the fixed effects specifications
given that most of the variation in weather is in the time series across all cities rather than in the
within–city time series.
Figure 4 provides a more nuanced look at the baseline probability of expulsion and how it relates
to average temperature deviation over time. During the thirteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries, the baseline probability of expulsion is around 1% or less. This jumps up to around 2.5%
during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. At least in this highly aggregated time
series view, there appears to be a strong correlation between the onset of the Little Ice Age during
the fourteenth century and an increased probability of expulsion. By contrast, there appears to
be little relationship between the period of greatest expulsions and an increase in the variance of
temperature. The standard deviation of temperature fluctuations steadily increases throughout our
period of study until the eighteenth century when it declines by a small amount.
As further, non-parametric, evidence for a correlation between negative temperature shocks and
expulsions, we calculated the average temperature across expelling and non-expelling cities in our
baseline regression sample. There are 785 expulsions in this sample and the expelling cities, on
average, experience a temperature deviation of -0.16 degrees. By contrast, among the 55,123 non-
expelling cities the average temperature deviation was only -0.054. If we control for the Black Death
years and the 1492 national expulsions, then expelling cities (of which there are 599) experienced an
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Figure 4: Baseline Probability of Five-Year Expulsion, Average Temperature, and Standard Deviation
by Century. Left axis measures the baseline probability of an expulsion of a Jewish community every
five years. Right axis measures each century’s average temperature deviation from the 1961–1990
average in degrees celsius. Right axis also measures the standard deviation of temperature deviation
in the baseline regression sample by century.
average temperature deviation of -0.15 degrees whereas the comparable number for non-expelling
cities was -0.05. So, in general, there does seem to be a correlation between cold weather and
Jewish expulsions, with expelling cities experiencing temperatures roughly three times colder than
non-expelling cities.
5.3 Analysis and Results
We employ a linear probability model where our main dependent variable, Expulsion, takes on
a value of 0 or 1.37 For our preferred baseline specifications we focus on explaining the within
variation in expulsion probability and adopt a standard fixed effects framework. Since we do not
expect the relationship between weather and expulsions to be constant over time, we run a series
of flexible specifications in which we interact our variable of interest with a full vector of century
dummies. These specifications take the following form:
37When we re-do our analysis using a logit estimator the results are unchanged. We prefer the linear probability
model because of the large number of city and time dummies included in most regressions as well as for its ease of
interpretation.
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yit =
1700∑
j=1100
βj Temp Deviationit + φi + Urban Densityit + it (3)
where yit is a dichotomous variable representing either an Expulsion in city i during period t or an
Expulsion or Persecution. j indexes the centuries 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600, and 1700.
We include a full vector of city fixed effects, φi, as well as controlling for Urban Density in all
regressions. In most regressions we will also control for the years of the Black Death by including
intercept and slope shift parameters. Our primary variable of interest is βj which we expect to be
negative and significant for centuries when negative temperature shocks increase the probability of
an expulsion.
We also estimate a version of specification 3 in which we interact Temperature Deviation with Poor
Wheat Suitability so as to refine our estimate of β consistent with Prediction 2 from the model.
yit =
1700∑
j=1100
βj Temp Deviationit · Poor Wheat Suitabilityi + φi + Urban Densityit + it (4)
We will also estimate versions of specifications 3 and 4 in which we include a full vector of dummy
variables for each five-year period. This will allow us to compare our preferred fixed effects es-
timates, which uses all the within variation in Expulsions across cities, with the difference-in-
difference estimates which only utilize within city variation in Expulsions. Standard errors for the
fixed effects specifications are clustered at the modern-country level.38 The difference-in-differences
specifications don’t have sufficient rank to cluster at the country level, so we report Huber-White
standard errors instead.
Table 1 reports our main regression results using Expulsion as the dependent variable. In column
(1) we report β coefficients from estimating equation 3 using the full sample. They indicate that
negative weather shocks increased the probability of an expulsion in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries but, surprisingly, decreased the probability during the fourteenth century. In column (2)
where we estimate 4 using cities with constrained wheat suitability as our treatment group, we get
similar results, except now the coefficients on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are larger. One
possible explanation for what is driving the positive coefficient for the fourteenth century in our
estimates is that the years of the Black Death also happened to be relatively warm, on average (see
38This seemed the most reasonable level of hierarchy on which to cluster. When we re-run the specifications
clustering at the city level, our standard errors significantly decrease.
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Weather x 1200 -.0168105 -.0103596  -.0143495  -.0081121 -.0049539 .0035553
(.0151989) (.0131598) (.0146603) (.0125525) (.0040735) (.004214)
Weather x 1300 .0309097* .0307169* .0171041  .0188263  -.0108265* -.0008252
(.0164337) (.016746) (.0122849) (.0124574) (.0062907) (.0060798)
Weather x 1400 -.0625417** -.0657637** -.0657982*** -.068843*** 0.0076556 -.0121578*
(.0227286) (.024577) (.0224599) (.0241625) (.0057262) (.0070193)
Weather x 1500 -.0282092*** -.0396574*** -.0298793**  -.0412817**  -.0238347** -.0314513***
(.0147709) (.017264) (.0148567) (.0173182) (.0119333) (.0086697)
Weather x 1600 .0011035 .0019727 .0006831 .0015565 .0115263 .0051643
(.0036283) (.0055365) (.0038402) (.0057462) (.00706445) (.0035271)
Weather x 1700 .0001953 -.0002348  -.000132 -.0005066 .0021461 .001066
(.0019131) (.0025912) (.0018581) (.0025758) (.0030356) (.0027763)
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Interacted with Wheat Suitability No Yes No Yes No Yes
Black Death Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban Population Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 55908  55908 55908 55908 55908 55908
F-statistic 13.97 29.50 38.48 60.25 9.24 8.61
Dep. Variable = Number of  Expulsions in Five-Year Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 1: Baseline Results Using Five-Year Average Sample. All regressions include city fixed effects
and controls for urban population density. Columns (1), (3), and (5) are estimated based on specifi-
cation 3 in the text. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are estimated based on specification 4 in the text. All
fixed effects regressions are cluster at the modern–country level. Difference-in-differences regressions
have Huber-White standard errors reported. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Figure 3). As such we include intercept and slope shifts for Black Death years for the following
regressions.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 are identical to (1) and (2) except they exclude the Black Death
years. As expected, the coefficients on the fourteenth century now become indistinguishable from
zero. The coefficients on the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries are negative and economically
significant. In column (4), where we restrict our treatment group to cities that have wheat suitability
that is moderate to poor the coefficient on the fifteenth century suggests a one standard deviation
decrease in the average temperature (one-third of a degree) raises the five-year probability of an
expulsion by about 2%. This is relative to a baseline that is also about 2%. In the sixteenth
century the comparable effect of a one standard deviation decrease in temperature is an increase
in expulsion probability of just over 1% (again, relative to a baseline probability of 2%). Figures 5
24
Figure 5: Specification (3) from Ta-
ble 1. Dependent Variable = Expul-
sions; Fixed effects estimator. Both
good and poor wheat suitability cities
included in treatment group.
Figure 6: Specification (4) from Ta-
ble 1. Dependent Variable = Expul-
sions. Fixed effects estimator. Only
poor wheat suitability cities included
in treatment group.
and 6 illustrate the results of the regressions in columns (3) and (4) respectively.
In columns (5) and (6) we run regressions identical to those in columns (3) and (4) except we
include a full vector of period dummies. These difference-in-differences estimates tell a largely
similar story to the fixed effects estimates, except the coefficients shrink in size, consistent with
most of the correlation in expulsion probability across cities. In column (5), where the treatment
group includes all expelling cities the coefficient on the fourteenth century becomes negative and
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the sixteenth century shrinks slightly but retains its
significance at the 5% level. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the fifteenth century becomes
indistinguishable from zero under the difference-in-differences specification. In column (6) where
we focus on a treatment group consisting of cities that have poor wheat suitability the coefficients
on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are both negative and significant at the 10% and 1% levels
respectively, though they shrink in magnitude relative to the comparable fixed effects estimates in
column (3). The coefficients from column (6) are graphed in Figure 7.
When focusing on Expulsion as the dependent variable, the regressions in Table 1 tell largely
the same story. There is strong evidence that negative temperature shocks during the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries resulted in a both economically and statistically significant increase in
the probability of expulsion of Jewish communities from their cities. In addition, none of the
estimates on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries show any evidence whatsoever of an effect of
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temperature deviation on expulsion probability. Finally, we find weak evidence that there may have
also been a negative effect of weather during the fourteenth century (assuming the Black Death
years are controlled for). Consistent with the predictions of the model, all of these results become
stronger when we control for the suitability of a cities agriculture for wheat cultivation. Overall, the
results in Table 1 suggest the mechanisms in our model linking temperature shocks to expulsions
began to operate sometime in the fourteenth century, were strong during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, and then ceased to operate during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Robustness Checks
In this section we perform some robustness checks on the main set of results presented above. In
the first two regressions in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 we check whether our main results hold
up using yearly data rather than our baseline five-year averaged data. In column (1) where we
use city fixed effects and take all expelling cities as being treated by the weather shock, we find a
negative and significant effect of weather, consistent with our five-year sample. The coefficient on
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is -0.004 and significant at the 5% level. Considering that these
are the yearly rather than the five-year probabilities of an expulsion, these estimates are consistent
with our baseline results. When we restrict our treated group to cities with poor wheat suitability,
then the estimated effect becomes larger for the sixteenth century, in keeping with our predictions
and the baseline results.
In column (3) we return to using the baseline five-year sample, but drop the Spanish national
expulsions in 1492. Relative to our baseline estimate in Table 1 column (3) the coefficient on the
fifteenth century is cut in half, but it retains its significance at the 5% level.
In regressions (4), (5), and (6) of Table 2 we switch from using Expulsion as a dependent variable
to using the dichotomous variable ‘Expulsion or Persecution’. In Column (4) we replicate our
baseline specification from Table 1 using the expelling cities with poor wheat suitability as the
treated group. The coefficients on fourteenth and fifteenth century are larger (more negative) and
increase in significance relative to our baseline results. When we include period dummies to obtain
difference-in-differences results in column (5) we find significant negative effects of temperature
deviations for the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. The large and negative coefficient
on the fourteenth century when including persecutions is not surprising given that over a third of
the persecutions in our data are from that century (277 out of 616). Surprisingly, we also find a
small positive effect of temperature on Expulsions or Persecutions in the seventeenth century in
the difference-in-differences regression. Overall, relative to the comparable regression in Table 1
the impact of temperature decreases is larger across the board. The coefficients in regression (5)
from Table 2 are graphed in Figure 8.
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Weather x 1200 .0010079 .0014974 -.0024667  -.0227489  -.0112181  .0008427 
(.0022179 ) (.0023043) (.0129189) (.008956 ) ( .0081643 ) (.0023745 )
Weather x 1300 .003887 .00377 .0177618 -.0034819  -.0485703*** .0027172
(.0032964) (.0026478) (.0131363) (.0328265) (.0126887) (.0028544)
Weather x 1400 -.0040768**  -.0040407** -.033038** -.0745307*** -.0179271** -.0060725***
(0021596  ) (.0016006) (.0120819) (.0227572 ) (.0081674) (.0018553)
Weather x 1500 -.0040734** -.0057384** -.0400745** -.0382273** -.0329244*** -.0053963** 
(.002118) (.0025184) (.0171641) (.0179551) (.0099072) (.0024539)
Weather x 1600 .0001614  .0004453 .0019525 .0057904 .0110993* .0006894
(.0004598) (.0006805) (.0058144) (.0073533  ) (.006218 ) (.0007698)
Weather x 1700  -6.48e-06 -.0001261 -.0002864  .0012943 .0051672 .0002392
(.0002255) (.0003062) (.0025665) (.0032718) (.0045246) (.0003572)
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No No No No Yes No
Interacted with Wheat Suitability No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Black Death Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1492 Dropped No No Yes No No No
Urban Population Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five-Year Sample No No Yes Yes Yes No
Yearly Sample Yes Yes No No No Yes
Obs 270884 270884  55812 55908  55908  276569
F-statistic 57.41 83.44 4.02  13.74 9.85  66.49
Dep. Var. = Expulsion Dep. Var. = Expulsion or Persecution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 2: Robustness regressions using five-year and yearly data. All fixed effects regressions are cluster
at the modern–country level. Difference-in-differences regressions have Huber-White standard errors
reported. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Finally, in column (6) of Table 2 we run our baseline fixed effects specification using Expulsion or
Persecution as the dependent variable and yearly data. The results are consistent with our baseline
results from the five-year data, again keeping in mind that the coefficient estimates are about five
times smaller since they now represent yearly probabilities rather than the five-year probability of
an expulsion or persecution occurring.
Overall, our empirical results strongly support Predictions 1 and 2 for the fifteenth and the sixteenth
centuries (and weakly support them for the fourteenth). (1) A one standard deviation decrease in
temperature made expulsions more likely, usually by increasing the five-year probability of expulsion
by 1% to 2% relative to a baseline probability of 2%. (2) This effect was larger in cities with an
agricultural sector facing greater constraints to growing the staple crop, wheat. However, our results
do not shed any direct light on why the relationship between climate and expulsions disappeared
after 1600. In the next section we discuss how we interpret the temporal pattern displayed by our
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Figure 7: Specification (6) from Ta-
ble 1. Dependent Variable = Expul-
sions. Difference-in-differences estima-
tor. Only poor wheat suitability cities
included in treatment group.
Figure 8: Specification (5) from Ta-
ble 2. Dep. Variable = Expulsion or
Persecution. Difference-in-differences
estimator. Only poor wheat suitabil-
ity cities in treatment group.
regression coefficients in light of Predition 3 from the model.
5.4 Why did the relationship between weather and expulsions break down after
1600?
The number of expulsions diminished after 1600, but the practice did not disappear. Expulsions
and persecutions of Jewish communities remained a prominent feature of the European landscape
up to the end of the early-modern period. Jews were expelled from Vienna in 1669/70, from
Munich in 1715, and from Stuttgart in 1731. Other groups suffered expulsions in this period: the
Moriscos of Spain were expelled in 1609; the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 resulted in
banishment of the large and prosperous French Protestant community; and over 12,000 Protestants
were expelled from Salzburg as late as 1731.39 According to our results, what did change after 1600
was the relationship between weather and expulsions.40
There are several possible reasons why the relationship between bad weather and expulsions weak-
ened after 1600. The first possibility is that there were simply fewer Jewish communities to expel
by the seventeenth century. During the medieval period Jewish populations had been widely dis-
tributed across Europe, but many of these were destroyed by 1600.
39Chaney (2008) finds that the expulsion of the Moriscos had a long term negative impact on urbanization and
population density.
401744 Maria Theresa, ruler of the Habsburg empire, expelled the Jews of Prague. But this was one of the last
such occurrences in western or central Europe. Other rulers of Europe, including George II of England, pleaded with
her to retract the order (Katz (see 1974, 12–13) and Vital (see 1999, 1–4)).
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France 25,690 6,530 174 5 8.85
England 3,665 1,420 25 0 inf
Germany 41,710 19,430 202 13 7.24
Italy 30,135 8,680 81 4 5.83
Switzerland 2,950 715 15 2 1.82
Spain 36,390 0 112 0 inf
Portugal 6,195 0 21 0 inf
Austria 4,270 1,435 12 7 0.58
Poland 16,590 24,075 27 17 2.30
Expulsions After 1600
Expulsions per 
City Year 
Before/After 
1600
Region
City-Years Before 1600 City-Years After 1600 Expulsions Before 1600
Table 3: City-years Jewish community present and expulsions before and after 1600.
Nevertheless, this fact alone does not account for the breakdown in the relationship between weather
shocks and expulsions after 1600. In our dataset there were thirty-one recorded persecutions in
England in addition to seven city-level expulsions before the general expulsion of all Jews from the
country in 1290. In comparison, there are no recorded persecutions or expulsions after 1655. We
can see the difference still more clearly by examining the territories that comprise modern France.
In our dataset there are fifty-nine city-level persecutions prior to 1600, in addition to numerous
expulsions both local and national (a total of 174 cities expelled Jews). To account for the fact that
more French cities had Jewish communities in the middle ages than in the seventeenth century, we
calculate the total number of city-years associated with a Jewish presence in our data before and
after 1600. The number of city-years before 1600 was indeed greater than after 1600 (25,690 years
compared to 6,530 years). In our data, however, we find only three persecutions after 1600 relative
to the 174 expulsions before.41 Another way of stating this is that expulsions were almost nine
times more likely before 1600 in France than before. Table 3 shows the comparable numbers for
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Poland. For Spain and Portugal, the
lack of expulsions after 1600 is due to there being no Jews to expel. However, with the exception of
Austria, these data strongly suggest that the fall in the number of persecutions in western Europe
we observe was not just because there were no Jewish populations to expel.
One possible economic explanation for the reduction in the number of expulsions in western Europe
and the breakdown in the relationship between temperature shocks and expulsions is that economic
growth and an increase in agricultural productivity led to a gradual relaxation of the subsistence
constraint (↑ Y A). It is certainly true that from the eighteenth century onwards onwards Malthu-
sian conditions weakened and per capita incomes gradually began to increase. Nunn and Qian
(2011) document the role played by the potato in increasing population density and urbanization
41This calculation almost certainly understates the difference between the medieval and the early-modern periods
since our methodology is likely to undercount earlier persecutions relative to later persecutions.
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after 1700. However, these developments occurred too late to explain the breakdown in the rela-
tionship between expulsions and weather shocks in a period when the European economy remained
Malthusian (Ashraf and Galor, 2011) and agricultural productivity in much of Europe remained
low and stagnant.42
An alternative explanation of the breakdown in the relationship between economic shocks and
expulsions is a reduction in the religious tension and antisemitism. We cannot exclude this argument
as no data exists that enable us to measure religious attitudes or tension in the early modern
period. Nevertheless, several arguments count against this being a decisive factor in explaining the
weakening of the relationship we observe between economic shocks and antisemitic expulsions after
1600.
The Reformation itself did not lead to a decrease in the number of expulsions and persecutions. Both
Protestant and Catholic cities continued to expel Jewish communities: there were 123 expulsions in
the sixteenth century of which twenty-eight occurred in Protestant cities. Much recent scholarship
tends to argue that religious tensions and the potential for religious conflict remained high into
the eighteenth century. Kaplan (2007, 337) observes that ‘Europe remained sharply divided by
faith after 1648. Whatever accommodations and arrangements they made in practice when living
together, whatever their daily interactions, on an ideological plane Catholics and Protestants in
particular remained committed foes. They hated one another’s churches, rites, and dogmas, and
this antagonism remained a force in European politics. Leibniz, for one, believed that unless this
fundamental division were overcome and the two groups reunited, the Peace of Westphalia would
prove to be a mere truce, a temporary respite. The fires of conflict still smoldered beneath the ash,
he warned, and would inevitably break out again’.43
If a diminution of religious fervor truly did occur after the end of the Thirty Years War, it is
difficult to empirically distinguish this hypothesis from our hypothesis that the rise of stronger and
more centralized states with better political institutions led to a breakdown in the relationship
between climatic shocks and expulsions. In our model, stronger states (↑ γ) are less likely to
42Recent research finds evidence that the Malthusian equilibrium weakened in England during the seventeenth
century (Crafts and Mills, 2009, see for instance). But the overwhelming consensus is that agricultural productivity
remained low outside England and the Netherlands throughout the seventeenth century (see Allen, 2000, amongst
many others).
43The late seventeenth century was marked by the persecution of Catholics in England following the Titus Oates
conspiracy in 1678 followed by religiously tinged conflict between the followers of James II and William of Orange in
Ireland and Scotland in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. Elsewhere, there was the persecution of Protestants by
Louis XIV in France following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; the brutal suppression of the Waldensians of
Savoy in 1685; and the War of Ce´vennes in Switzerland and southern France. In general: ‘[t]hough the first half of
the eighteenth century, then, many Europeans continued to suspect religious dissenters of disloyalty and to lash out
at them in times of war . . . religious violence—popular, official, military—constituted in many parts of Europe in the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The age of religious wars had not yet ended’ (Kaplan, 2007, 342-343).
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conduct an expulsion in response to a negative economic shock. The main empirical support
for this hypothesis comes from the Dutch Republic, England, and France. Jewish communities
established in the Netherlands and England in the seventeenth did not suffer any recorded instance
of persecution nor did they suffer expulsion. The English Jewish community was initially viewed
as a transitory group of alien merchants with limited rights. Their position was uncertain and in
1660 a petition came before Parliament to expel them. This petition was ignored, but it was only
after the Glorious Revolution that the permanent status of Jews in England was fully recognized
and accepted (Katz, 1994, 140-141 and 188). A similar process took place, albeit more gradually,
in France. Cardinal Richelieu played a crucial role in protecting Portuguese crypto-Jews from
being persecuted as heretics because of their value as merchants and financiers. Israel describes
this as ‘a classic instance of raison d’E´tat politics and mercantilism’ the result of which was to
have ‘knowingly condoned the shift to Jewish rather than Catholic allegiance in France, a policy
subsequently continued by Colbert. It was this government stance which made possible that steady
transition from the 1630s down to the 1680s by when the Portuguese communities in France had cast
off all remaining pretense and openly organized as Jewish congregations with rabbis and services in
Hebrew’ (Israel, 1985, 96-97). By 1722 the right of all French Jews to openly practice their religion
was recognized in law.
Historians and sociologists have documented how the birth of new nation states in the late medieval
period was often accompanied by the expulsion of the Jews and other ‘alien’ populations (Baron,
1967a; Menache, 1987; Barkey and Katznelson, 2011). This factor was certainly an important
one in explaining the expulsion of Jews from England in 1290 and Spain in 1492.44 However,
the increases in state capacity that occurred from 1600 onwards and which are documented by
Bonney (1995); Dincecco (2009); Johnson and Koyama (2012b) led to the formation of states that
were less vulnerable to unrest amongst either the populace or the elite, and better at reducing
interfaith and inter-communal violence, all factors that led to fewer persecutions and expulsions.
Popular antisemitism survived.45 But the empirical evidence we present suggests that the new
nation states of western Europe were less responsive to it. This is consistent with the findings
that stronger states were responsible for ending the European witch-hunts in the late seventeenth
century (Levack, 1996; Johnson and Koyama, 2011) and with the argument that the rise of larger
and more centralized states led to a gradual increase in bounds of religious toleration in the early
modern period (Johnson and Koyama, 2012a).
44For studies of the expulsion of Jews from England see Leonard (1891); Elman (1937); Ovrut (1977); Menache
(1987); Stacey (1997, 2000); Mundill (1998); Katznelson (2005); Koyama (2010b). For studies of the expulsion of
Jews from Spain see Kamen (1988); Gerber (1992); Roth (1995).
45There is little evidence of a lessening in antisemitic attitudes. Judensau—woodcut images denigrating Jews—
remained common in Germany until 1800. Poliakov (1955, 174-202) examines a large number of antisemitic treatises
published in France during the seventeenth century that suggest that antisemitism was widespread and conventional
in both elite and popular circles. For details on the survival on antisemitic stereotypes and attitudes in England after
the re-admittance of Jews into the country see Poliakov (1955, 203-209) and Felsenstein (1999).
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Jews continued to suffer persecutions and massacres in early modern Europe but these occurred in
the ungoverned periphery of Europe and not in western or central Europe. The worst massacres oc-
curred during the Khmelnytsky Uprising which saw the Ukraine breakaway from Poland-Lithuania
in the mid-seventeenth century (Stampfer, 2003). Similarly, the Haidamaks who killed Jews in the
Ukraine during the eighteenth century, flourished in lawless and ungoverned parts of the country.
It goes without saying that this increase in state capacity was a two-edge sword: it could be used
to persecute as well as protect. In the twentieth centuries, the capacity of modern states made
possible the industrial horrors of the Holocaust. But in the period between 1600 and 1800 it was
associated with a reduction in violence against minority groups.46
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of negative supply shocks on the treatment of religious or ethnic
minorities. We exploit the fact that the economies of medieval and early modern Europe were
predominantly agrarian and use exogenous variation in temperature during the growing season
to identity the effect of supply shocks on the probability of a Jewish community suffering an
expulsion or persecution. We find a one standard deviation decrease in temperature is associated
with approximately a 1% to 2% increase in the probability of expulsion during any given five-year
period. The effect of supply shocks on expulsions is larger in areas with poor soil quality for wheat
cultivation and more muted in areas with good quality soil.
We interpret these findings using a political economy model which describes the conditions under
which rulers will find it rational to expel or expropriate a minority community. Viewed through
this lens, our results suggest that temperature shocks put pressure on rulers to expel Jews both as
a means to make up lost tax revenue as well as to quell popular violence. The model predicts that
more developed states with greater fiscal capacity and greater political stability, were less likely to
expel Jewish communities as a result of these shocks.
The relationship between cold weather and expulsions breaks down after 1600. We consider a
number of explanations for why this was so and provide supporting historical evidence that the
rise of modern states in this period was one factor behind Europe’s gradual transition away from
being a ‘persecuting society’.
46Jews achieved full civic rights more gradually. The Habsburg emperor Joseph II began the process of granting
Jews civic rights in 1782. But it was the French Revolution and the subsequent invasion of Germany by French
armies that led to the imposition of Jewish emancipation in central Europe (Berkovitz, 1989; Vital, 1999). After the
defeat of France, these reforms were partially reversed but the movement towards Jewish emancipation resumed and
culminated with the removal of all disabilities on Jews in Austria-Hungary in 1868 and Germany in 1870 (see Katz,
1974; Mahler, 1985; Sorkin, 1987).
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Descriptive Statistics
Expulsion overall 0.006 0.078 0.000 1.000 N=130620
between 0.006 0.000 0.050 n=933
within 0.077 -0.044 0.999 T=140
Temp Deviation overall -0.060 0.346 -1.330 1.370 N=130620
between 0.028 -0.156 -0.001 n=933
within 0.345 -1.273 1.427 T=140
Expulsion or Persecution overall 0.011 0.114 0.000 2.000 N=130620
between 0.011 0.000 0.079 n=933
within 0.114 -0.068 1.997 T=140
Poor Wheat Suitability overall 0.705 0.456 0.000 1.000 N=130620
between 0.456 0.000 1.000 n=933
within 0.000 0.705 0.705 T=140
Jewish Presence overall 0.422 0.492 0.000 1.000 N=130620
between 0.233 0.000 1.000 n=933
within 0.434 -0.564 1.415 T=140
Urban Density overall 10.223 12.132 0.000 329.829 N=130620
between 8.557 1.182 135.521 n=933
within 8.604 -91.265 267.510 T=140
Expulsion overall 0.014 0.118 0.000 1.000 N=55908
between 0.026 0.000 0.333 n=933
within 0.116 -0.319 1.007 T-bar=59.9228
Temp Deviation overall -0.057 0.339 -1.278 1.370 N=55908
between 0.096 -0.502 0.293 n=933
within 0.328 -1.426 1.262 T-bar=59.9228
Expulsion or Persecution overall 0.025 0.173 0.000 2.000 N=55908
between 0.035 0.000 0.333 n=933
within 0.171 -0.308 2.009 T-bar=59.9228
Full Five-Year Sample, 1100-1799
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Main Regression Sample (Jewish Presence=1), 1100-1799
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Full Five-Year Sample and Regression Sample. Upper panel shows
statistics for five-year data including all possible observations. Lower panel shows statistics for five-
year data used in most regressions. Lower panel assumes Jewish Presence=1 and Urban Density is
non-missing. See text for variable descriptions.
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A Data Appendix
The appendix is available online at https://www.dropbox.com/sh/kf05gu0xgojv1va/6hAW7s-bPA
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